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Punishment and Democratic Theory 
Resources for a Better Penal Politics 
Albert Dzur, Ian Loader, and Richard Sparks 
Introduction 
On July 16, 2015, President Barack Obama toured El Reno Federal Correctional 
Institution near Oklahoma City and had a forty-five-minute roundtable discussion with 
six nonviolent drug offenders, a conversation recorded by HBO for a documentary on 
criminal justice. Mass incarceration, the president said during his visit, has become an 
unquestioned part of American life: “We have a tendency sometimes to almost take it for 
granted or think it’s normal. It’s not normal. It’s not what happens in other countries. 
What is normal is teenagers doing stupid things. What is normal is young people making 
mistakes.”1 The president’s El Reno trip was intended to build support for a significant 
shift in federal policy: reduction or elimination of mandatory minimum sentences, 
alternative sanctions for nonviolent offenders, restoration of voting rights to former 
prisoners, and “ban the box” rules to discourage employers from asking job candidates 
about their criminal records. The president’s visit and his proposed reforms illustrate a 
departure from a dominant leadership paradigm in the United States, aptly characterized 
by Jonathan Simon as “governing through crime.”2 For over a generation few political 
costs were paid and many benefits reaped by elected officials for increasing sentences, 
ignoring racial disparities, and indeed considering mass incarceration to be “normal.” 
President Obama’s attempt to bring criminal justice into public view, to begin a dialogue 
 on how to punish better and more fairly, is in itself a significant change in the political 
culture.3 
The president’s prison visit is a further sign that over recent years, in the wake of 
the crime drop and falling levels of public concern with and attention to crime, the 
seemingly inexorable upsurge in US imprisonment is slowing down, or being sent into 
reverse.4 The recent publication and discussion of high-profile reports on the problems of 
mass incarceration and police racism and brutality are also indicators that the terms of 
debate about crime and justice may be shifting.5 It is no doubt too early to tell to what 
extent, or how durably, the penal climate is altering and to know whether recent reversals 
signify a material change (in that climate), or simply a reversible fluctuation (in the penal 
weather). It would certainly be naïve to rely on simple optimism that things are taking a 
turn for the better, to assume that state austerity will alone be sufficient to produce 
significant penal change, or to underestimate the reach and embeddedness of the 
American carceral state.6 In this regard, we should recall something else that makes the 
El Reno trip remarkable: Obama was the first sitting president to visit a federal prison, 
the first leader of America’s democracy to visit the unfree world that has been 
constructed in that democracy’s midst. What had been keeping these powerful men away 
for so long from the disempowered and disenfranchised? What was so repellent about the 
institutions over which the president has ultimate oversight? Why did it take the 
intolerable financial burden of massive public spending on incarceration at a time of deep 
economic recession to push criminal justice, slowly and hesitantly at first, on to state and 
federal executives’ agendas? 
 These are important caveats: reminders of the invisibility of the prison within the 
life of modern democracies. It may nonetheless be the case that room is opening up for 
new forms of constructive thinking and strategic intervention in the penal field wherein 
we can bring to bear new intellectual resources in addressing questions of punishment.7 
But what concepts and arguments are available to us at this moment of possibility, after 
more than a generation of “normal” mass incarceration, to speak to its abnormality and to 
fix what is broken about a dysfunctional system that implicates all of us who have grown 
accustomed to it and in whose name it was assembled? What social and institutional 
resources exist for creating different futures for the penal arrangements of modern 
capitalist democracies? How—if at all—can criminology and related forms of knowledge 
make such futures more likely to be achieved? What are the best outcomes for which we 
can reasonably hope in penal politics? 
In this introductory chapter we want to outline and develop the core idea that 
animates this volume: namely, that one underexploited resource for a better penal politics 
lies in investigating the ideals and institutions of democracy and thinking about how 
these ideals can be theorized and given practical effect in reshaping the criminal justice 
and penal arrangements of advanced capitalist democracies today. 
The Long Shadow of Mass Incarceration 
Over the last thirty years mass incarceration (especially in the United States) came to 
seem inexorable and unremitting. This was so not just in terms of chronically high levels 
of imprisonment. It was also registered in terms of massive racial disproportion and the 
demotic symbolic politics that made “the prison” appear a necessary, obvious, 
commonsense solution to problems of crime and violence. But the more immovable mass 
 imprisonment came to seem, the more it imposed a block on our capacity to imagine 
alternatives to it. The major and urgent task became that of tracing the contours of this 
phenomenon and grasping its social, institutional, economic, and cultural impact. 
The long shadow cast by mass incarceration over penal scholarship has generated 
much original work on this phenomenon and its wider consequences. We consequently 
now know a great deal about the structural causes of this phenomenon and about the 
political dynamics that have fueled and shaped it.8 Of late, rather more sustained attention 
has been devoted to examining the effects of mass incarceration, not only in terms of its 
impact on crime,9 but also in respect of how it has reshaped other institutions of 
American society from the economy, to families, to communities, to the political 
process.10 This has been important work. But beneath the shadow cast by penal excess it 
is also possible to discern certain temptations and attendant pathologies that have 
informed both analyses of mass imprisonment and prescriptions for how best to respond 
to it. Our judgment is that these pathologies have become an impediment to our capacity 
to think not just about, but also beyond, mass incarceration. 
Common among them, we suggest, has been nostalgia: a lament for a better and 
lost world in which welfare liberal social policies were ascendant, where these coincided 
with (or helped produce) imprisonment rates that were lower and more stable, and where 
the climate of social and penal policymaking was much “cooler” and more rational. As 
we have noted elsewhere, this lamentation for mid-twentieth-century welfare liberalism 
(or in European terms, social democracy) is often accompanied by the miserabalist 
premise that what gets bad is going to get worse.11 In terms of intervention, the heating-
up of the penal climate over recent decades has given rise to a situation in which 
 countervoices of social science have tended to eschew spaces of public engagement for 
fear of being trashed by a febrile media, as well as adopting a certain defensiveness in the 
diagnosis of what is to be done. The result is that penal politics has come to be seen as a 
rear-guard action where the principal objective is damage limitation or the protection of 
the hard-won and fragile gains of the past. 
Two points might usefully be made about these structuring orientations toward 
mass incarceration. The first is to ask why lament and defensiveness has become so 
prevalent in the social analysis of, and responses to, penal excess. One answer is that 
mass imprisonment has played to criminology’s self-image (and, we should add, its 
strengths) as a “dismal science.” Our most powerful and compelling stories of penal 
change are narratives of decline and disaster. They have variously documented, warned, 
alerted, and critiqued. In the process the field has spun or imported (and sometimes 
loosely deployed or overextended) certain now-familiar concepts—risk, populism, 
punitiveness, and neoliberalism being obvious cases in point. But the social analysis of 
punishment has much less frequently speculated, reconstituted, or imagined alternatives 
to the penal disasters that it describes or denounces. 
The second is to bring more clearly into view one alternative world that is to be 
found (sometimes expressly, often implicitly) in dominant accounts of mass 
imprisonment. What holds these responses to mass incarceration together, we think, is an 
outlook that one might call penal elitism. This is the worldview which holds that so long 
as experts—government officials, justice professionals, lawyers, researchers, and so on—
are given the predominant say over the shape of penal policies, or else reinstated to a 
position of dominance, better penal outcomes will follow—where “better” means 
 something along the lines of more moderate, milder, rights-respecting, liberal, or 
principled. The flip-side of this warm embrace of expertise has been a certain “discomfort 
with democracy”:12 a fear of permitting the demos too great an influence over penal 
policy and a concern that too intimate a connection between the public and policymakers 
will lead to immoderately punitive measures. This discomfort with democratic practice 
(and the resultant tendency to neglect democratic theory)13 has been one of the most 
striking analytic effects generated by the three decade long penal upsurge. It has come 
close to acquiring the status of orthodoxy among analysts and critics of mass 
incarceration—one that has made a return to insulated professionalism and technocratic 
governance seem an obvious antidote to “hot” issues such as criminal justice. Protecting 
punishment from democracy has, in short, become the default answer to the question of 
what we can reasonably hope for in penal politics. So much so that the problematic that 
animates and organizes this book may (initially) strike readers as counterintuitive, even 
decidedly odd. 
Distrust of the public has first and foremost shaped thinking on how to explain the 
rise of mass imprisonment—and the “exceptional” character of penal regimes in the 
United States. Reflected in scholarship on so-called penal populism, but also in the day-
to-day assumptions of politicians and sitting government officials, looms an image of the 
punitive public demanding tough sentences and resistant to progressive reform. This, the 
argument runs, has been coupled with “the radically extensive and extraordinarily 
decentralized quality of US democracy”14—porous state and local political systems that 
have given way to democratic pressures of uninformed electorates and frenzied media 
responses to dramatic criminal events.15 The ability of penal bureaucrats to manage or 
 fend off these pressures is, conversely, posited as the principal explanation for the 
relative mildness of punishment in Scandinavia and parts of Western Europe.16 By 
extension, keeping the public at bay has become a central plank of several influential 
accounts of how to temper punitive excesses. Here the claim is that the only way to scale 
back imprisonment is to insulate criminal justice policy through more backroom 
decisions, more expert interventions in sentencing commissions, and fewer grandstands 
offered to politicians seeking office on the back of tough-on-crime promises. The 
attendant ambition is to defend existing institutions of mediation between public demands 
and penal outcomes (such as parole boards) or to create new expert authorities, operating 
at one remove from direct political pressure, in and through which rational penal policy 
can be formed.17 
Such technocratic solutions have also loomed large in recent governmental 
thinking about how to navigate a route away from mass incarceration. Even as the current 
administration began to draw mass incarceration into focus as a policy problem, high-
ranking officials continued to block broader critical thinking on the issue as a public 
problem. In 2013, at the beginning of the policy shift, US Attorney General Eric Holder, 
the nation’s most visible criminal justice professional, proclaimed that his colleagues 
needed to be “smarter on crime,” meaning more sensible about sentencing for nonviolent 
or low-level offenses and more conscious of the racial biases of current practice.18 
Though Holder applauded the professionalism of his colleagues standing at the gateway 
to prison—the police, attorneys, prosecutors, judges, wardens, probation officers—his 
“smarter on crime” remarks implied that status-quo tough sentences and racial bias do not 
lead to safer streets; they are “dumb.” At a time when leading scholars increasingly see 
 criminal justice as “the most dysfunctional of the major institutional accomplishments of 
the Enlightenment,”19 Holder’s framework suggests that the way forward is a return to 
Enlightenment rationality (rather than an immanent critique of it) to become more 
sophisticated criminal justice experts and professionals. Being smart on crime, on this 
view, means listening to the experts more and the electorate less. 
Penal Politics and Democratic Hope 
This volume takes issue with technocratic discourse and the attendant suspicion of the 
public—and its participation in political life—that is at its root. It is not entirely correct to 
say, as President Obama did, that “we,” meaning “the public,” think mass incarceration is 
normal. It may be more precise to say that we the public have not been provided many 
opportunities to think seriously about mass incarceration at all. Crime and punishment 
saturate news and entertainment media, to be sure. But we actually don’t engage in much 
concerted public discourse about the process or the practices our taxes support. Indeed, 
institutions involved in policing, adjudicating, and punishing have successfully repelled 
critical public awareness and involvement. Criminal justice work is often physically 
removed from the lay public, as with prisons that tightly control communication and 
interaction with those outside. Probation and other postincarceration administrative 
decisions and programs too are normally conducted outside the public gaze, commonly 
attracting attention only when something goes very wrong. Even the court process 
leading to prison can hardly be called public, as backroom plea bargaining has drastically 
replaced trials, leaving a scant 1 to 4 percent of state and federal criminal cases in the 
United States for the courtroom. 
 The aim of this volume is to connect debate about the future of punishment to a 
wider conversation about ideals and institutions of democracy. We want to encourage 
research and reflection on the mutually corrosive relationship that occurs, but also on the 
mutually supportive associations that may be fostered, between penal practices and 
democracy. In so doing, our aim is to treat democratic values and commitments as an 
underexploited “resource of hope” for building a better—by which we mean more 
deliberative and inclusive—penal politics.20 Doing this, however, means making 
connections between areas of scholarship that have long and puzzlingly been 
disconnected: namely, between the social analysis of punishment and political theory in 
general and democratic theory in particular. 
The United States remains the “world champion” in incarceration, to borrow Nils 
Christie’s words, and jurisdictions in the United Kingdom, though some distance behind, 
are persistently among the European countries with the highest per capita rates of 
imprisonment. Yet until recently Anglo-American political theory has hardly registered 
mass incarceration and has done little to analyze any incongruity with mainstream 
normative commitments.21 This disconnect is puzzling, first, because of the powerful 
lines of argument present within progressive, liberal, and conservative traditions alike 
which draw limits to state coercion and demand strict scrutiny over threats to individual 
rights, human development, and civic dignity posed by institutionalized exclusion and 
stigmatization. It is puzzling, second, because of the common ground occupied by 
restorative justice advocates and political theorists concerned with deliberative 
democratic institutional design. It is puzzling, third, because of the available links to 
robust and sophisticated theoretical discussions within criminology by David Garland, 
 Jonathan Simon, and other scholars on the state, citizen action, and efficacy of 
punishment. 
But this general dissociation between punishment and political theory also holds 
for the more particular domain of theorizing about democracy. The disconnection that 
concerns us here is of a particular kind, and the allegation may at first sight appear 
somewhat puzzling. Of course legal and political theorists have long concerned 
themselves with problems about the relationship between systems of law and personal 
and political liberty, and with questions about the justification of coercion in general and 
the right to punish in particular. Our point is rather that it is just because these sorts of 
problems are of such central and permanent interest that the slow and hesitant extent to 
which scholars of those questions have taken note of a phenomenon of such scale and 
consequence as that of contemporary mass incarceration is so puzzling. Against this 
backdrop, this volume therefore also invites people whose primary focus is with the 
concept of democracy and the development of democratic practices to consider how mass 
incarceration bears upon their core concepts and fundamental arguments about how 
institutions function and how they might improve, or be supplemented, or replaced, or 
transformed. Contemporary democratic theorists have to date done considerably less to 
address the subjects of crime, punishment, prison, and re-entry than we might have 
expected, despite the massive social, political, economic, and moral reverberations of 
mass incarceration. At a time often referred to as a renaissance in democratic theory, the 
field has been eerily silent on punishment. We think this neglect—what Bernard Harcourt 
has called the “invisibility of the prison in democratic theory”22—has emaciated 
scholarship on power, social justice, political equality, citizenship, institutional 
 innovation, and related topics. By avoiding the real world of mass incarceration, 
democratic theory has risked becoming less democratic, less relevant to political reform, 
and less able to contribute productively to public discourse. 
So just how should we go about better acquainting democratic theory with the 
study of mass incarceration in particular and punishment in general? How might the 
former alter the ways in which we think about, research, and evaluate the latter? Why 
should the carceral state command the attention of democratic theorists? What questions 
open up if we examine punishment though the lens of democratic theory and practice? 
We want to suggest three main ways in which a productive interplay between punishment 
and democratic theory is being developed. 
A first line of analysis seeks to extend the critique of mass incarceration by 
situating it within the frame of democratic ideals and practice, thereby extending and 
recasting our analysis of what is at stake in penal policy and politics. Much of the 
empirical research on American punishment in recent years has focused on the impact of 
political systems on punishment—whether in terms of the advent of governing through 
crime,23 the rise of symbolic and populist political forms,24 the incentive and opportunity 
structures created (or blocked) by different political arrangements,25 or the mobilization 
of social movements in the penal field.26 But thinking about punishment through the lens 
of democracy also calls for analyses of the impact of mass incarceration upon democratic 
politics.27 
To think democratically—rather than simply in crime control terms—about 
punishment is not just to revisit longstanding questions about the claims of retribution, 
deterrence, or rehabilitation as penal aims, or about the grounding of the sovereign right 
 to punish in general. Rather, in our current contexts, it is also to seek to ask sharper 
questions about the collateral effects of the transformations of the carceral state upon 
political participation, the formation of civic identities and the associational life of 
impacted communities. The recent body of work on felon disenfranchisement is most 
obviously of importance here. But the very particular and locally variable phenomenon of 
felon disenfranchisement is one that opens a much wider set of concerns. It has as such 
provided a jumping-off point for the emergence of broader research agenda on what 
Lerman and Weaver term the political consequences of the carceral state, for 
investigating and theorizing the ways in which American punishment “violate(s) the 
democratic imperatives of voice, responsiveness, and accountability.”28 The further 
development of this agenda entails, among other matters: demonstrating that how 
societies punish goes to the quality and reach of their democratic claims; problematizing 
the relations between (excessive) punishment and democratic legitimacy; and identifying 
the ways in which crime control institutions attend to, or breach, democratic principles. 
A second—in some respects more established and well-trodden—path entails 
finding within penal and political theory arguments for restraining the reach of the penal 
state, whether via desert theory, penal communication, or republicanism. Democratic 
theory has, arguably, been an underutilized resource in such normative thinking about 
justifying and limiting the scope of state punishment. It is a field that might usefully be 
mined further in order to make the numerous sage recommendations for penal moderation 
or parsimony more compelling and better grounded—and we and others have recently 
intimated that the concepts of legitimacy and citizenship might prove to be useful 
meeting grounds for extending that conversation.29 In our view, such an extension of 
 penal theory offers grounds for questioning the democratic credentials of a society that 
punishes its citizens in the way that the American polity currently does. Quite a few 
criminologists in the United States and elsewhere have taken steps in these directions,32 
sometimes in alliance with progressive administrators and practitioners, and those parties 
need to be both supported and challenged by democratic theory. 
A third point of connection is to be found in the use of democratic theory as a 
resource for exploring strategies of penal reform and for more broadly reconstructing 
how democratic societies might respond to crime. This has been a lively but still nascent 
theme with a small body of literature on deliberative democracy and punishment. Work 
here has largely developed as a response to, and critique of, the orthodoxy of insulating 
criminal justice from political control. It has sought instead to explore the unfulfilled 
promise of the ideal of greater democratic participation in crime control, and to bring to 
notice and advance understanding of practical innovations that give effect to such public 
involvement, in respect of restorative justice, justice reinvestment, and beyond.33 There 
remains a great deal more theoretical work to be done along these lines, not least in 
demonstrating that populism and technocracy are not the polarized ideologies they are 
typically assumed to be within criminology, but can be theorized instead as twin 
pathologies of our contemporary anti-political malaise,34 both of which “disfigure” the 
ideal and practice of democratic government by neglecting the normative force of 
democratic procedures.35 But there is also a rich agenda of research and theorizing 
entailed in furthering practices of “democratic experimentalism” in crime control and 
punishment36—that is to say, in fostering the development of, and learning lessons from, 
deliberative practices whose aim is to promote civic reintegration, emphasize mutual 
 accountability for penal decisions, and foster proper recognition that those whom we 
punish are co-citizens.37 In other words, we need greater reflection on what it would look 
like to impose sanctions without magnifying existing inequalities and in ways that 
maintain equality of concern and respect for all parties involved. 
In our view, these points of intersection between democratic theory and penal 
practice offer a theoretically rich and politically promising agenda for thinking about 
punishment beyond mass incarceration. It is an agenda that focuses—via the three 
moments of critique, restraint, and reconstruction we have described—on the aims and 
practices of crime control institutions and asks from the standpoint of democratic theory 
what one tasks police, probation, and prisons to do. From this standpoint, the overarching 
question that emerges is how to produce criminal justice institutions that contribute to 
democratic development and build up civic capabilities and participatory resources. Can 
this democratic ambition for criminal justice be justified, and if so how? What might one 
require of different criminal justice institutions if we conceived of their purposes at least 
in part in these terms? How would such institutions have to be remade and reimagined if 
they are to become agents of a deeper democracy? 
Organization of this Volume 
This collection of original chapters seeks to catalyze an engaged, multidisciplinary 
discussion among philosophers, political theorists, and theoretically inclined 
criminologists about how contemporary democratic theory might begin to think beyond 
mass incarceration.38 Rather than viewing punishment as a natural reaction to crime and 
imprisonment as a sensible outgrowth of this reaction, we frame these as institutions with 
deep implications for contemporary civic identity and that present unmet demands for 
 public oversight and reflective democratic influence. What conceptual resources can be 
deployed to support decarceration and alternatives to prison? How might democratic 
theory strengthen recent efforts in restorative justice and other reform movements? How 
can the normative complexity of criminal justice be grappled with by lay citizens rather 
than experts or officials—from street-level policing decisions, to adjudication, to prison 
and probation policy? How, in short, might modern publics forge a creative alternative to 
an unreflective commitment to mass incarceration? In reflecting on these questions, the 
authors investigate how to better situate the prison in the discourse of reform, offer 
conceptual guideposts for thinking about incarceration, critically examine the methods 
and uses of public opinion regarding punishment, and suggest ways of reconceiving 
crime control institutions to enhance rather than thwart citizen capabilities. 
One explanation for the doxa surrounding the normalcy of mass incarceration, and 
a problem facing any attempt at a more critical public discourse for reform, is social 
geography. As Rebecca Thorpe’s chapter forcefully points out, prisons are out of sight, 
out of mind, and highly ambiguous for many people. The rapid growth of prisons since 
the 1970s, especially in rural America, has provided jobs and revenues in impoverished 
communities. This kind of public investment is an economic dead end, however. As 
prison areas are rarely sites of further growth or development, it represents the 
shortsighted triumph of penal policy over more constructive approaches to rebuilding the 
poor, urban, and racially segregated neighborhoods disproportionately filling the rural 
prison cells. 
How to orient our normative thinking about reform is the subject of the next three 
chapters. Reform efforts targeting contemporary penal institutions need to take their 
 bearings from some overarching understanding of the purposes served by criminal 
justice. Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall draw attention to the ideal role of the criminal 
law in a democratic republic, understood as a political society made up of free and equal 
citizens. Criminal law in such a society would be recognized by citizens to be something 
they shared and took part in as a common law. Focusing in particular on citizens 
convicted of crimes, they discuss the civic roles related to punishment that emerge in a 
democratic republic and how these roles, considered as a matter of ideal theory, reflect 
just how far current punishment practices are from widely embraced political ideals. 
Seeking a gravitational principle that can shed light on the core question of just 
how much punishment is enough, Richard Dagger calls our attention to the importance of 
fair play. When punishment is deployed justifiably it intends to pay back those who do 
not play fair and it communicates disapproval of rule breaking, thus shoring up a 
cooperative, law-abiding system. When used in excess, it is a symptom of dysfunction 
calling into question the fairness of the laws and the status of the polity as a cooperative 
enterprise. Honing in on the value of political equality, Peter Ramsay argues that taking 
this value seriously results in strict limits on the use of imprisonment as a sanction. It is a 
mistake, he argues, to see an incarcerated person as a full and equal citizen. Prison 
inevitably takes away the exercise of free association and free assembly, and it severely 
limits free speech. Prisoners are in no way able to take part on equal terms with their 
fellow citizens in the regular political process. Political equality demands radical 
decrementalism in penal reform and points the way toward the abolition of incarceration. 
Chapters 6 and 7 consider what more widespread citizen participation might 
contribute to criminal justice institutions. Focusing on adjudication and sentencing, 
 Christopher Bennett asks whether greater lay participation would help produce more 
moderate decisions than the professionalized, official justice that has done little to block 
the development of mass incarceration. Democratization efforts may prove less beneficial 
in this respect than some scholars believe, he argues, but could be normatively significant 
nonetheless if they held citizens responsible as co-owners for punishment enacted for the 
public good. One approach already available for involving citizens as stakeholders in 
criminal justice is the wide range of practices offered by restorative justice programs as 
supplements to or substitutes for traditional sentencing procedures. Thom Brooks 
discusses the advantages of restorative justice as an alternative to mainstream criminal 
procedures for both victims and offenders. To serve as an effective institutional reform 
movement, however, restorative justice needs to become a more routine part of the 
criminal justice system and expand to handle a wider variety of cases, including serious 
offenses. To do so, Brooks argues, it may need to include penalties like suspended 
sentences and short prison stays for cooling off or rehabilitation. 
Chapters 8 through 10 approach the complicated and controversial relationship 
between public opinion—about criminal offenses, offenders, and proper punishment—
and the development of public policy that undergirds mass incarceration. In response to 
what she sees as the limitations of mainstream academic discourse, Lynne Copson argues 
that any satisfying theory of criminal justice reform must move some significant distance 
from conventional assumptions about what the public wants from crime control measures 
and what victims and offenders require. Reform must be grounded in utopian thought: 
committed to posing large and general questions about the kind of society we wish to 
have and the kind of citizens we hope to become. 
 Taking up the debate over so-called penal populism, David Green and Elizabeth 
Turner reject the aforementioned elite-centered orthodoxy that points to the political 
success of “tough on crime” campaign rhetoric and advocate expert dominated 
sentencing commissions insulated from demotic electoral pressures as an antidote to 
penal severity. Like Copson, Green and Turner favor more direct and robust public 
involvement. Decremental strategies that rely on stealth, Green points out, have had some 
modest success in the United States and United Kingdom, but they do nothing to build 
lasting support among the citizenry. It is better for governments to expand real 
opportunities for the public to contribute to criminal justice policy discussions, 
policymaking, and adjudication. One possibility Turner explores is the use of deliberative 
democratic techniques such as deliberative polls and citizens’ juries, which have 
uncovered less public support for “get tough” measures than traditional public opinion 
polling because they typically provide context and promote discussion of multiple 
viewpoints. While it is a mistake to think that such methods disclose “real” public 
opinion, they do ask people to foster defensible positions, alert them to issues they may 
not have contemplated, and help participants see their connections to others’ lives. 
Rebuilding crime control institutions that can both respect and enable the civic 
capacity of regular citizens is an uphill struggle. Chapters 11 to 13 take aim at 
exclusionary practices in the penal system, policymaking process, and in the legal 
system. Amy Lerman and Vesla Weaver investigate the legal and institutional barriers to 
democracy inside prisons. An early twentieth-century reform idea, inmate self-
governance through advisory councils thrived in the 1960s and 1970s, reflecting reform-
minded idealism about creating more democratic prisons as well as pragmatic thinking 
 about how to respond to inmates’ demands for voice that had found violent expression in 
disruptive riots. Despite early positive evidence about the effects of inmate associations, 
courts have held that the state’s interest in prison safety supported a tight rein on 
organizations such as unions. The prison was not a “public forum,” the Supreme Court 
held in 1977, allowing administrators to override the associational rights of inmates and 
block organizations if they had the potential for disruption. Drawing on survey data from 
California prisons, Lerman and Weaver show that inmate participation in self-governance 
correlates with a decrease in prison violence. They advocate further democratic 
innovation inside one of our currently least democratic institutions. 
Lisa Miller disputes the common view of the American political system as overly 
sensitive to democracy in its openness to popular pressure. She shows how the 
combination of federalism, separation of powers, multiple decision-making venues, and 
judicial supremacy produce a labyrinthine obstacle course with many veto points for 
those with the resources to block social policy. The public good of security from violence 
has close connections to poverty reduction, employment, education, and other social 
welfare measures, but the complexity of the American system—not to mention its 
counterdemocratic fixtures such as the Senate and Supreme Court—makes it extremely 
difficult for these to survive the policy gauntlet. 
Drawing attention to relatively unexplored links between democratic theory and 
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